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IS FREE SPEECH AN ACADEMIC VALUE?  
IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE? 
 
Daniel Gordon*  
Stanley Fish is a leading commentator on the First Amendment. But 
when it comes to the topic of academic freedom, he is in a class by himself. 
“I am announcing the inauguration of a new field—Academic Freedom 
Studies,” he declared in Versions of Academic Freedom.1 Before Fish, 
scholars generally celebrated the invention of the modern doctrine of 
academic freedom by the American Association of University Professors in 
the early twentieth century. In contrast, Fish construes academic freedom as 
ambiguous—not as a rising arc of liberty but as a bone of contention in the 
campus culture wars. Chapter three of The First is entitled “Why Freedom of 
Speech is Not an Academic Value.” It is worth isolating this chapter in order 
to do justice, in a brief review, to at least one component of Fish’s superb 
book. I will start by explaining how Fish insists on a stark separation between 
academic freedom and the First Amendment. I will then contrast how Fish 
de-constitutionalizes academic freedom with how William W. Van Alstyne 
portrayed academic freedom as a subset of the First Amendment. 
Fish underscores that free speech is not in fact a pervasive social value: 
“no one really believes in free speech.”2 A commitment to achieving 
excellence and getting things done in any professional sphere involves limits 
on speech. A nurse, as Fish notes, cannot lobby for higher wages during an 
operation.3 For Fish, the university is much like an operating room. The 
university’s distinctive function is to support research and to expose students 
to the questions and findings of the disciplines. The ethos of the university is 
incompatible with many forms of speech, such as the promotion of political 
ideology in the classroom—an object of attack throughout Fish’s Save the 
World on Your Own Time4, and the target of criticism at the end of Chapter 
three of The First.    
Nor is political advocacy in the classroom protected by academic 
freedom. For academic freedom, as Fish understands it, is the freedom to 
 
* Professor of History, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
1 STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
6–7 (2014) [hereinafter FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM].  
2 STANLEY FISH, THE FIRST: HOW TO THINK ABOUT HATE SPEECH, CAMPUS SPEECH, RELIGIOUS 
SPEECH, FAKE NEWS, POST-TRUTH, AND DONALD TRUMP 35 (2019). 
3 FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 77. 
4 STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME (2008). 
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engage in activities that are internal to one’s discipline. Fish, then, does not 
see academic freedom as translatable into First Amendment doctrine. The 
First Amendment does not give an extra margin of freedom to academics as 
compared to other citizens. However, Van Alstyne purports to show how 
“academic freedom has found a niche in the hard law of the Constitution.”5 
A survey of Van Alstyne’s account of how academic freedom figures in 
Supreme Court discourse will put us in a position to ask probing questions 
about Fish’s effort to distinguish academic freedom and the First 
Amendment. 
The term “academic freedom” made “its first express Supreme Court 
appearance,”6 as Van Alstyne puts it, in Justice Douglas’s dissent7 in Adler 
v. Board of Education. Later in the same term Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff solidified, according to Van Alstyne, 
“the identification of academic freedom protection as a subset of first 
amendment law.”8 Both Douglas and Frankfurter referred to the educational 
sphere as a zone in which free speech should have an extra margin of liberty. 
At issue in these cases was state legislation which scrutinized educators on 
the basis of their political allegiance. Justice Douglas spoke of the public 
school as “the cradle of our democracy.”9 Imagining a school in which 
students, parents, and outsiders policed the political ideology of teachers, he 
described the repressive atmosphere that would ensue: 
What was the significance of the reference of the art teacher 
to socialism? Why was the history teacher so openly hostile 
to Franco Spain? Who heard overtones of revolution in the 
English teacher’s discussion of the Grapes of Wrath? What 
was behind the praise of Soviet progress in metallurgy in the 
chemistry class?10 
And he added, “There can be no real academic freedom in that environment 
. . . . The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous thinking; she 
becomes instead a pipeline for safe and sound information.”11 In other words, 
the classroom is not the same as the operating room.   
In Wieman, Frankfurter wrote the following—the italics are Van 
Alstyne’s: 
 
5 William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of 
the United States: An Unhurried Review, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 81 (1990). 
6 Id. at 105. 
7 Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
8 Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 107–08; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
9 Adler, 342 U.S. at 508.  
10 Id. at 510. 
11 Id. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter 
what their calling. But, in view of the nature of the teacher’s 
relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are 
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action 
upon thought, in the case of teachers, brings the safeguards 
of those amendments vividly into operation . . . . It has an 
unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit 
which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and 
practice.12  
Of the many subsequent cases Van Alstyne discusses in which the Court 
acknowledged academic freedom to be a subset of the First Amendment, the 
one posing the deepest challenge for Fish is Bakke. The landmark affirmative 
action case considerably modified the scope of academic freedom.13 First, 
because the racial background of a student is not in itself an academic 
consideration in a traditional sense. Secondly, because Justice Powell was 
clear that what diversity enhances is the quality of the university’s social 
environment rather than its specifically academic functions. To illustrate “the 
benefits derived from a diverse student body,”14 Justice Powell cited 
Princeton president William G. Bowen. Bowen affirmed that “a great deal of 
learning occurs informally”—in “unplanned, casual encounters” with 
roommates, fellow workers in the library, and teammates. The experience of 
diversity in these encounters improves “personal growth,” according to 
Bowen.15 In Bakke, then, academic freedom is the right of university 
administrators to decide what is conducive to the moral and social 
development of the students.    
It would be fascinating to hear Fish respond to the line of cases elicited 
by Van Alstyne, a line which seems to prove that academic freedom has been 
constitutionalized. Fish might sustain his distinction between academic 
freedom and constitutional law by noting that most of the cases pertain to 
institutional academic freedom as opposed to individual academic freedom. 
That is, the Supreme Court has protected the right of universities to function 
on their own, but universities may well be free to restrict the speech of their 
faculty for professional reasons—for example, to ban political advocacy in 
the classroom, as Fish has advised universities to do. The problem, however, 
 
12 Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 108 (citing Wieman, 344 U.S. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).  
13 Van Alstyne includes Bakke among those cases in which the Supreme Court recognizes 
academic freedom as a First Amendment concern. But the analysis of Bakke here is my own. Van Alstyne 
was reluctant to acknowledge that Bakke changed the connotation of academic freedom in any way. See 
Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 137. 
14 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 n.48 (1978). 
15 Id.  
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is that in the course of defending institutional academic freedom, the Court, 
since Adler, has repeatedly deployed a rhetoric that configures the university 
as a special free speech zone.    
Additionally, Bakke inscribed, under the rubric of academic freedom, 
pursuits that are not academic. Bakke constitutionalizes and thus considerably 
enhances the prestige of that area of the university known as Student Affairs 
and Campus Life. I am not sure if the important point here is that Bakke 
wreaks havoc with Fish’s conception of academic freedom, or if Fish’s 
conception should make us concerned about how Bakke configures academic 
freedom. Fish appears to be mistaken about academic freedom not being a 
constitutional value, but he helps us to see that we might be better off if it 
weren’t.  
 
